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FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL POWER:
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Michael C. Dorf *
I. BACKGROUND
Following the contested election of 1876, as part of the com-
promise that gave the United States Presidency to Rutherford B.
Hayes, Union troops were withdrawn from the states of the former
Confederacy.' As a more or less direct consequence, the formerly
enslaved African Americans, who had begun to exercise political
power under Reconstruction,2 were once again disenfranchised.3 The
Fifteenth Amendment would remain all but a dead letter until the civ-
il rights movement of the mid-twentieth century.
Along with direct challenges to Jim Crow came legal chal-
lenges to the various restrictions and qualifications that states and
their subdivisions placed on African-American suffrage.4 Literacy
tests were a favorite device.s As Justice Thomas recounted in his
separate opinion in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility No. One v.
Holder6 ("NAMUNDO"), such tests dated back to the period imme-
. Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This Article is based on an oral
presentation given at the Practising Law Institute's Eleventh Annual Supreme Court Review
Program in New York, New York. The printed text retains much of the conversational style
of the initial presentation. Many thanks to the editors of the Touro Law Review for supply-
ing formal citations for my oblique references.
1 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 917, 940-41
(2009).
2 Donald G. Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: African-Americans, Rights Consciousness,
and Reconstruction, 17 CARDozO L. REv. 2115, 2129-30 (1996).
3 Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 942.
4 Id. at 965.
Id.
6 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
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diately following the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment.7
Literacy tests were an effective tool of racially selective dis-
enfranchisement because, as a legacy of slavery and continuing in-
equality in educational opportunities, the African American popula-
tion was disproportionately illiterate.' To compound the
disproportionate impact of literacy tests, white illiterates were often
permitted to vote under "grandfather clauses" extending the franchise
to those whose grandparents (in the time of slavery) had voted.
The blatant race discrimination of the literacy-test-plus-
grandfather-clause was invalidated by the Supreme Court as early as
1915.9 Nevertheless, state officials were creative, so when one stra-
tagem failed, a new one sprang up, and the new ploy was used until
it, too, was struck down.o But, by then, yet a new disenfranchising
technique had been developed.
These tactics were very effective at disenfranchising African
Americans in the South, and accordingly, when, a century after the
conclusion of the Civil War, Congress finally addressed them, it
needed equally effective countermeasures. The Voting Rights Act
("VRA") of 1965 created one such mechanism. Devices that have
the purpose or effect of suppressing minority votes violate the sub-
stance of the VRA." In addition, under section 5 of the VRA, if a
state or one of its subdivisions in a "covered jurisdiction" attempts to
change its voting rules in any way, it must first submit the proposed
change either to a three-judge court in the District of Columbia or to
the Attorney General for what has become known as preclearance. 12
The Attorney General or special court determines whether the
change would have the effect of disproportionately disenfranchising
or diluting the voting strength of the minority population. 3 The pre-
clearance requirement is limited to certain statutorily specified cov-
ered jurisdictions, mostly in the South.14 Congress originally deter-
7 Id. at 2521 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
8 Id.
9 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367 (1915).
10 NAMUNDO, 129 S. Ct. at 2520.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 2009).
12 Id. § 1973(c).
1 Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role of State
Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REv. 343, 350 (2008).
14 Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81
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mined which areas were covered by identifying those places that had
a history of disenfranchisement.
Shortly after its adoption, the VRA was challenged and sus-
tained. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,15 the Court found that the
VRA was a valid exercise of Congress' power to enforce the substan-
tive provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment.' 6 Since then, the VRA
has been periodically reauthorized, most recently by a near-
unanimous Congress in 2006.17
II. NORTHWESTA USTIN MUNICIPAL UTILITY No. 1 V. HOLDER
The NAMUNDO case presented two questions: (1) whether a
municipal district in Austin, Texas was eligible to "bail out" of the
provisions of the VRA; and if not, then (2) whether the VRA as ap-
plied in NAMUNDO was unconstitutional as beyond the power of
Congress to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.' 8 The Court only ad-
dressed the statutory issue, although its statutory interpretation was
clearly influenced by constitutional considerations.
Under the VRA, a political subdivision of a covered state is a
covered jurisdiction.19 However, the VRA permits a subdivision to
"bail out"-that is, to avoid the requirement-of pre-clearance if it
can show that notwithstanding the factors that led Congress to classi-
fy the larger jurisdiction as covered, the particular subdivision is, so
to speak, "clean." 20 Although the City of Austin is clearly a subdivi-
sion of the state of Texas, it was not obvious that the municipal dis-
trict at issue in NAMUNDO counted as a subdivision under the
VRA's language, because it is not a county and does not register its
own voters, but instead relies on another political entity for voting
registration. 2' Thus, the quite technical question of statutory interpre-
tation was whether the VRA could be construed to make the munici-
DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 231 (2003).
1s 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
16 Id. at 308.
7 NAMUNDO, 129 S. Ct. at 2510.
' Id. at 2517 (Thomas, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 2511 (majority opinion).
20 Id. at 2509 ("Congress recognized that the coverage formula it had adopted 'might
bring within its sweep governmental units not guilty of any unlawful discriminatory voting
practices' . . . . It therefore 'afforded such jurisdictions immediately available protection in
the form of... [a] 'bailout' suit.' ").
21 Id. at 2514.
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pal district eligible for bailout.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts that gar-
nered eight votes, said yes. 22 Even though the statutory language is
most straightforwardly read to indicate that the district should not be
eligible, the Court appeared to rely on a principle of constitutional
avoidance to find nevertheless that the district was eligible for bai-
lout. Hence, there was no need to reach the more difficult constitu-
tional question of whether section 5 of the VRA is still valid.23
In a lone opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part, Justice Thomas disagreed on the statutory point, but
not on the point that the Austin district should be eligible for bai-
lout.24 He contended that even assuming that his colleagues reached
the right conclusion-that the district was eligible for bailout-the
majority should not have avoided the constitutional question because,
in his view, the decision did not give the plaintiff district everything
it requested.25
Only Justice Thomas directly reached the constitutional ques-
tion,26 but the majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts included
pointed hints about the Court's view of that question. 27 Had the ma-
jority reached the constitutional question, there is a good chance it
would have found section 5 of the VRA unconstitutional. Justice
Thomas directly stated that he would find it unconstitutional without
delay.28
III. THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK: WHERE WERE THE
LIBERALS?
Interestingly, none of the more liberal Justices wrote separate-
22 NAMUNDO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516-17.
23 id.
24 Id. at 2517 ("Given its resolution of the statutory question, the Court has thus correctly
remanded the case for resolution of appellant's factual entitlement to bailout.").
25 Id. at 2518 ("Absent a determination that appellant is not just eligible for bailout, but is
entitled to it, this case will not have been entirely disposed of on a non-constitutional ground
.... Invocation of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is therefore inappropriate in this
case.").
26 Id. at 2519 (Thomas, J., concurring).
27 NAMUNDO, 129 S. Ct. at 2510-12 (majority opinion).
28 Id. at 2517, 2519 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he constitutional issue presented and
hold that [section] 5 exceeds Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.").
[Vol. 26508
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ly in NAMUNDO to take issue with the Chief Justice's hints that the
VRA could be held invalid in a future case. In this respect,
NAMUNDO calls to mind Grutter v. Bollinger.29 There, after uphold-
ing the University of Michigan Law School's program of race-based
affirmative action in admissions, Justice O'Connor suggested that her
ruling could be expected to expire after twenty-five years.30 She was
joined by the Court's four most liberal Justices, none of whom regis-
tered any disagreement with that prediction. Thus, it appears that
even for relatively liberal Supreme Court Justices, government inter-
ventions to promote racial equality-whether in the context of voting,
as in NAMUNDO, or higher education, as in Grutter-have a limited
shelf life.
Why has the Court's liberal wing accepted these limits? I
would offer three potentially overlapping hypotheses. First, it is
possible that the Court's liberals in Grutter and NAMUNDO joined
opinions with which they did not fully agree in an effort to moderate
the overall impact. In NAMUNDO in particular, the liberals may
have feared that the conservatives would cast five votes actually to
invalidate section 5 of the VRA. By giving Chief Justice Roberts a
near-unanimous opinion, they may have gotten an opinion that, at
least formally, rested only on grounds of statutory interpretation.
Second, it may simply be a mistake to refer to "liberals" on
the current Supreme Court. Justice Stevens, who is arguably the
most liberal member of the Court, was a staunch centrist on the
Burger Court-and Justice Stevens is widely expected to retire at the
conclusion of the October 2009 Term. By the standards of the War-
ren and Burger Courts, the Roberts Court has a center-left, a center, a
right, and a far right, but no left.
Third, even if one thinks that there are real liberals on the Ro-
berts Court, on matters of race, the political center of the Court and of
the country have moved decidedly away from the sort of identity pol-
itics that the VRA could be thought to reflect. Here we may draw a
useful comparison with the confirmation hearings of Justice Soto-
mayor. Democratic Senators who strongly supported confirmation
took pains to portray her as a moderate or even a tough-on-crime
conservative. None made any serious effort to defend her much-
29 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
30 Id. at 325.
2010] 509
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discussed "wise Latina" remark3' or the opinion she authored in Ricci
v. DeStefano.32
IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Among the constitutional issues the Court did not reach in
NAMUNDO was a long-simmering question: what is the standard for
judging Acts of Congress purporting to enforce the Thirteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments? Beginning in 1997, in City of Boerne v.
Flores, a series of Supreme Court cases have held that the power of
Congress to enforce section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only ex-
tends to laws that are "congruent and proportional" to an underlying
violation of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court
would understand it.33 As a result, Congress cannot, in the guise of
adopting remedial and preventative measures under the Fourteenth
Amendment, stray too far from what the Court would say are viola-
tions of section 1 of that Amendment.
Although the Court has not attempted to specify with mathe-
matical precision just how closely related a remedial or preventative
measure must be in order to satisfy the congruence-and-
proportionality test, the pattern of results makes clear that the test is
considerably more demanding than the test applied in earlier cases
construing the enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. In those cases, which include South Carolina v. Kat-
zenbach, upholding the VRA in the first instance, the Court applied
the relaxed judicial scrutiny associated with Chief Justice John Mar-
shall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.34 As long as Congress
could have rationally believed that there was a problem to be ad-
31 See Mireya Navarro, Claiming A Loaded Phrase, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at STI.
The phrase was the sound bite from a longer quote-'I would hope that a
wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more of-
ten than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived
that life'-that drew ridicule from opponents of her nomination.
Id.
32 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008).
3 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Says. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997).
34 17 U.S. (316 Wheat.); see, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-40
(1968); Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
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dressed, the Court afforded very wide latitude.
Had the Court reached the constitutionality of section 5 of the
VRA in NAMUNDO, it would have had to resolve whether Acts of
Congress purporting to enforce the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments continue to be judged under the forgiving test of McCulloch or
whether, instead, the more demanding test of the recent Fourteenth
Amendment cases applies. In his NAMUNDO opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts sidestepped the standard-of-review issue. 36 Yet oddly, he as-
serted that section 5 of the VRA presents serious constitutional ques-
tions under either standard. 37 That assertion is odd because the Thir-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendment test focuses only on the rationality
of Congressional action, and just about anything passes the rational
basis test.38
Surely that includes section 5 of the VRA. Congress could
have rationally concluded that there remains a risk of racial discrimi-
nation in voting, and under the old test under the Thirteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, that should have been enough. One is thus left
with the suspicion that a majority of the Court thinks that the congru-
ence and proportionality test would, if the issue were squarely faced,
be deemed applicable to the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as
well as the Fourteenth. Elsewhere I have suggested a basis (besides
" See Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 44041 ("Surely Congress has the power under
the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of
slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation. Nor can
we say that the determination Congress has made is an irrational one.").
36 NAMUlNDO, 129 S. Ct. at 2512-13.
The parties do not agree on the standard to apply in deciding
whether, in light of the foregoing concerns, Congress exceeded
its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power in extending the
preclearance requirements. The district argues that '[t]here must
be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end' . . . ; the
Federal Government asserts that it is enough that the legislation
be a 'rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition'
.... That question has been extensively briefed in this case, but
we need not resolve it.
Id.
" Id. at 2513.
38 Cf Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1972) ("[T]he deferential 'old' equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact.").
2010] 511
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stare decisis) for maintaining the looser standard in Thirteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment cases, 3 9 but whether that or some other argu-
ment prevails will await a later day.
Meanwhile, if the congruence and proportionality test does
apply to section 5 of the VRA, the law faces serious constitutional
obstacles, as illustrated in the separate opinion of Justice Thomas.
Section 5 of the VRA Rights Act is three layers removed from the
underlying constitutional violation-if there is one. First, whereas
constitutional equality norms are only violated by express or purpose-
ful discrimination,4 0 the substantive provisions of the VRA forbid
practices with a merely discriminatory effect. 4 1 According to Justice
Scalia's concurrence in the Ricci case, not only do constitutional
equality norms permit disparate impact without discriminatory pur-
pose, the prohibition of disparate impact may itself be unconstitution-
al.42
The second level of prophylaxis in section 5 of the VRA is the
scope of the pre-clearance obligation. All changes must be pre-
cleared-even if there is no prior indication that a change will have a
discriminatory effect.43
Finally, there is a third level of prophylaxis: Even sub-units of
covered jurisdictions are subject to the pre-clearance requirement,
even when the individual sub-units have not been shown to have any
record of prior discrimination with respect to voting.44 With section
5 of the VRA thus triply removed from underlying violations of the
3 Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP.
CT. REv. 61, 91 n.126 (2001) (noting that an expansive interpretation of Congressional pow-
er to enforce the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments would not pose the same risk of
Congressional omnipotence that an expansive interpretation of Congressional power to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment poses, in light of the more specific subject matter of the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
40 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 (1986) (stating that the most important
question was "whether the defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful discrimina-
tion on the part of the State"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that
a facially neutral law or policy will not be deemed discriminatory unless it both has a racially
disproportionate impact and results from discriminatory motivation on the part of the state).
41 NAMUNDO, 129 S. Ct. at 2523; David 0. Barrett, The Remedial Use of Race-Based
Redistricting After Shaw v. Reno, 70 IND. L.J. 255, 265-66 (1994).
42 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
43 Mark A. Posner, The Real Story Behind the Justice Department's Implementation of
Section 5 of the VRA: Vigorous Enforcement, as Intended By Congress, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL'Y 79, 79 (2006).
4 Id. at 86, 88.
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Fifteenth Amendment, it would be relatively easy for the Court to
find that it fails the congruence and proportionality test, should that
test be deemed applicable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Finally, a deep irony if not cynicism infects the majority opi-
nion in NAMUNDO. Chief Justice Roberts criticized the selective
application of the pre-clearance requirement of section 5 of the VRA.
He deemed the singling out of particular parts of the country an af-
front to the equal sovereignty of the states. 4 5 Yet, in recent cases in-
terpreting Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court cited the failure of Congress to write geographical restrictions
into its statutes as a ground for finding those Acts unconstitutional.4 6
As far as civil rights laws are concerned, the rule appears to be
"heads the Court wins, tails Congress loses."
45 See NAMUNDO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511-12.
46 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 374 (2001); United
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